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Evil Women and Innocent Victims:
The Effect of Gender on California Sentences for
Domestic Homicide
Ryan Elias Newby*
I. INTRODUCTION
Karen Provencio is serving fifty years to life in prison for killing her
husband in their Temecula home in December of 1998.' She insisted his
death was an accident, caused by a gun going off in her hand when she
removed it from their bed for safekeeping.2 She and her husband fought
the night he died, and their children reported he was crying afterwards,
before they went to bed. That night, she shot him in the head while he was
sleeping.4 While she told friends shortly before the killing that he was
mean to her, Provencio said she could not leave because she did not want to
share custody of their children.' Several times over the two years
preceding the murder, Provencio told her neighbor that she wanted him
* Ryan Newby, Executive Articles Editor, Hastings Women's Law Journal, 2010-
2011, J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2011; B.A.,
Smith College, 2005. This Note is dedicated to my grandmothers, Marilyn E. Newby and
Sarah J. Allan. For her help in the research and methodology design in this project, as well
as her unflagging support, encouragement, and mentorship, I owe a debt of gratitude to
Professor Hadar Aviram. Any errors result from my implementation and not her advice. I
also thank Professor Aaron Rapaport, who gave me detailed and invaluable input on an
early report on this data in the Criminal Concentration Seminar. Thanks also to the Journal
staff who edited my work with care and dedication; this Note would not have been possible
without their considerable efforts.
My sister Diana helped me with my initial research, my father discussed the many
versions of my argument at length, my mother and aunt read and critiqued several drafts,
and my mother, step-father, and extended family tolerated my spending an entire holiday
visit working on this paper and encouraged me to keep at it. Finally, my husband, Coren
Rau, has read every draft of every paper I've written in law school; he has talked through
every proposition posed in this paper and those that did not survive from earlier drafts; he
has cooked for Journal meetings, tolerated my late nights, and even watched the World
Series at the Women's Law Journal office with me while I edited this Note.
1. Joe Vargo, Woman Denies Killing, JUNE 22, 2000, PRESS-ENTERPRISE, http://
www.press-enterprise.com/newsarchive/2000/06/22/961652036.html; People v. Provencio,
No. E027642, 2002 WL 31045485, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2002).
2. Vargo, supra, note 1.
3. Provencio, 2002 WL 31045485 at *1.
4. Id.
5. Id. at *2.
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dead, and once stated that she had found someone to do it. 6 She asked two
different lovers over the course of two years to kill her husband, and told
one of them that her sister had agreed to do it, but had "chickened out."7
She was sentenced an additional twenty-five years to life for the use of the
gun, on top of the twenty-five to life sentence for first-degree murder.8
James Linkenauger killed his wife, JoAnn, in January 1993.9 He
assaulted her several times during their two-year marriage.' 0 On the night
of her death, neighbors heard screaming coming from the Linkenauger's
home, and one neighbor saw Linkenauger "dragging a woman by the hair
toward the garage."" JoAnn's beaten and strangled body was found in a
ravine the next day.' 2 She was dressed in a nightgown and jeans, which
were pulled down around her knees.13 She had been strangled with such
force that her voice box was fractured. She had been beaten on the head,
face, and arms, causing her to lose two pints of blood.14 It appeared that
some of these injuries were caused by being hit with a fist "or slammed
against a wall or floor."' 5  The medical examiner testified that the
strangulation would have taken five to ten minutes, during which time she
would have been "acutely aware of the pain."' 6  The force of the
strangulation caused her to defecate, and blood was found in the carpet and
on the walls of the Linkenauger residence, as well as in the trunk of her
car.' 7 Linkenauger maintained his innocence but was convicted of first-
degree murder at trial and sentenced to twenty-five years to life.
The difference between the sentences in these two cases is that
Provencio received an enhancement for the use of a weapon and
Linkenauger did not. Sentence enhancements are supposed to deter
criminals from using guns while they commit felonies.' 8  Whether this
approach is effective in deterring crimes such as robberies, it seems a poor
fit for domestic crimes, where the set of motivations leading to violence
may be different than those in street crime.' 9 When women use weapons
6. People v. Pace-White, No. E028157, 2002 WL 661557, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 23,
2002).
7. Id. at *2.
8. Id.
9. People v. Linkenauger, 32 Cal. App. 4th 1603, 1606 (1995).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1607.
12. Id. at 1606.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1607.
16. Id. at 1606.
17. Id. at 1606-07.
18. See James M. LaValle, Guns and Homicide: Is the Instrument-Focused Approach to
Deterrence Efficacious?, 5 JUST. POL'Y J., no. 2, 2008 at 24, http://www.cjcj.org/justice
-policy-journal.
19. LaValle argues that such statutes may deter gun use during homicides, but do not
deter homicides. Id
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such as guns and knives in both defensive and aggressive interpersonal
violence, they are disproportionately affected by weapons enhancements
statutes, such as those in place in California.20
The purpose of this Note is to address two specific questions in this
broad area of social and legal problems. First, to what extent do women
and men commit crime differently, and what affect do those differences
have on the sentences they receive at trial? Second, what role do gendered
expectations for women's and men's behaviors play in their experiences as
defendants in spousal homicide cases? This Note addresses these questions
through an examination of seventy-three domestic homicide appeals in
California.
This Note demonstrates that to the extent that women and men commit
domestic homicide in different ways and for different reasons, their
outcomes at trial are different. In particular, this Note shows that women
are more likely to receive weapons enhancements because they are less
able to commit homicide using personal weapons (fists, hands, and feet)
compared to men. On the other hand, women who are able to show prior
aggression by their male partners may receive lesser sentences even when
they are unable to prove perfect self-defense. This Note does not explain
all differences or similarities between men's and women's cases, but is
limited to specific areas of inquiry. The purpose of this Note is to suggest
areas of further inquiry appropriate for studies with larger sample sizes.
Section II outlines two popular theories addressing disparate treatment
of men and women in the criminal justice system: specifically, chivalry and
paternalism theories, as well as the "evil woman" theory, which examine
why some women may be given lenient treatment while others are
sentenced harshly. Section III discusses ways in which women's and
men's crimes differ according to type, degree of violence, and overall
frequency, and the ways in which men and women offend differently in the
area of intimate partner violence. Section IV begins with the history of
Battered Woman Syndrome and its use in criminal law. The Section will
then discuss the role of the jury and the significance of extralegal
prototypes-juror conceptions of crime-in framing juror's decisions. The
Section ends with a discussion of homicide in the context of California's
determinate sentencing scheme.
Section V describes the findings from a quantitative and qualitative
analysis of women's and men's appeals from convictions of spousal
homicide in California. The Section begins by detailing the methodology
for study design and data collection. This is followed by Subsections
describing the findings of first the quantitative and then the qualitative
20. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022 (West 2010) (establishing a range of weapons
enhancements for use of firearms and other "dangerous or deadly" weapons in the
commission of a felony).
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analyses. The quantitative section investigates the correlations between
gender and degree of offense, weapon choice, and enhancements. The
qualitative section looks more closely at some of the women's cases by
grouping them according to the gendered implications of their crimes and
assessing the relationship between defendant and victim behaviors and the
degree of offense of conviction. Specifically, this analysis shows that the
extent to which a woman's behavior fits into traditional positive and
negative conceptions of female behavior seems to have a relationship to the
seriousness of the offense for which she is found guilty. Section VI will
discuss the results of this examination and suggest future research in this
same vein.
II. DISPARATE TREATMENT OF MEN AND WOMEN
The differing experiences of female and male defendants have been
widely noted. Justice Thurgood Marshall famously observed with
disapproval the much higher rate at which men are sentenced to die than
women: "It is difficult to understand why women have received such
favored treatment since the purposes allegedly served by capital
punishment seemingly are equally applicable to both sexes." 2 1 Today, that
disparity between the sexes continues. As of March 2, 2010, there were
684 men on California's death row and only 17 women.2 2 Capital cases are
an extreme example in any discussion of crime. Outside of the capital
context, there are also differences in the number of women and men
serving prison sentences. In California, women comprise less than 7% of
all prisoners. 2 3 This figure is not unique to California-women comprise
only 7% of all state and federal inmates nationwide.24
The disparity between women's and men's treatment under the law
may also be observed in the area of domestic violence arrests and
convictions. In one nationwide study of intimate violence cases in urban
counties, men were much more frequently the defendants in criminal
prosecutions for violence against their female partners than women were
for violence against their male partners-84% of cases involved a female
victim and male defendant.25 Further, convictions were more likely in
21. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 365 (1972) (Justice Marshall concurring).
22. CAL. DEP'T OF CORR. AND REHAB., CONDEMNED INMATE SUMMARY LIST 1 (2010).
23. CAL. DEP'T OF CORR. AND REHAB., PRISON CENSUS DATA AS OF JUNE 30, 2009 tbl.2
(2009) [hereinafter PRISON CENSUS DATA] (showing 11,033 women and 156,948 men in
prison for California convictions).
24. WILLIAM J. SABOL ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
PRISONERS IN 2008, at 2 tbl.2 (2009), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty--pb
detail&iid=1763.
25. ERICA L. SMITH & DONALD J. FAROLE, JR., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROFILE OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE CASES IN LARGE URBAN
COUNTIES 1 (2009), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty -pbdetail&iid=2024
(finding that, in a survey of intimate partner violence cases filed in sixteen large urban U.S.
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cases with male defendants and female victims than any other
combination.26 When women were convicted of intimate partner violence
against male victims they were less likely to be incarcerated than were
male offenders with female victims, or offenders of either sex with a victim
of the same sex. 27 Finally, women were twice as likely as men to use a
weapon such as a knife, gun, or blunt instrument, which may arise from the
28
statistically typical size difference between opposite sex partners.
Studies have also found differences between the sentences of men and
29
women who commit spousal homicide. As with other violent offenses,
fewer women are convicted of spousal homicide than are men. 30 There has
been much debate over the meaning of this difference and the different
sentences imposed. Some have argued that women who kill or otherwise
harm their husbands receive undue leniency due to illegitimate use of what
Alan Dershowitz has called the "abuse excuse."3 1 Dershowitz criticizes the
use of past harm to show the reasonableness of deadly violence.32 He and
counties in May of 2002, 84% of the time, defendants were male and victims were female
and in only 12% of cases were the defendants female and the victims male; a small
percentage of these cases were same-sex couples). Smith and Farole also found that in the
cases observed, nearly 60% of male defendants accused of harming female victims were
convicted, whereas only 40% of female defendants with male accusers were convicted. Id.
Further, 85.5% of women with male accusers were arrested on misdemeanor charges and
14.5% on felony charges. Id. For men with female accusers, those figures were 80.9% and
19.1%, respectively. Id.
26. SMITH & FAROLE, supra note 25, at 1.
27. Id. at 8 (showing that 5% of women convicted for committing a violent act against a
male victim were sent to prison and 65.8% were sent to jail; 7.5% of men convicted of
committing a violent act against a female victim were sent to prison and 76.2% were sent to
jail).
28. Id. at 3.
29. See, e.g., PRISON CENSUS DATA, supra note 23 at tbl.3 (showing that approximately
one third (33.9%) of women in California institutions committed personal crimes, whereas
over half of incarcerated men committed crimes against persons (56.1%)).
30. PATRICK A. LANGAN & JOHN M. DAwSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SPOUSE MURDER DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES iii (1995).
Langan and Dawson examined homicide cases including married, common-law, and
separated couples but not divorced couples. Id. at 2. Of the 222 women charged with
killing their husbands, 70% were convicted, whereas 87% of the 318 husbands charged were
convicted. Id. at iii. While many women and men plead guilty, 31% of women who went to
trial were acquitted, compared to only 6% of men. Id. While women were acquitted by
both judges and juries, none of the men in the sample were acquitted by a jury. Id.
31. CORAMAE RICHEY MANN, WHEN WOMEN KILL 126 (1996) (based on studies of
observers, arguing that women are treated less punitively than men who have committed the
same offenses); see also generally ALAN DERSHOWITZ, THE ABUSE EXCUSE (1994) (arguing
that Battered Woman Syndrome and other "abuse excuses" are overused in criminal
litigation and reflect an inappropriately lax attitude toward accountability in contemporary
United States law and society).
32. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 31, at 6. "A history of abuse is not a psychological or a
legal license to kill. It may, in some instances, be relevant at sentencing, but certainly not
always." Id. "Another serious problem with the abuse excuse-and other excuses that are
gender- or race-specific-is that it sends a dangerous double message of irresponsibility,
especially about women." Id. at 30.
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others, like James Q. Wilson, have argued that the acceptance of Battered
Woman Syndrome evidence shows a decline in the importance of personal
responsibility in American society." Whether this particular contention is
accurate, some studies of intimate partner homicide have indeed shown
women and men being arrested for first-degree murder at similar rates, but
convicted at different rates. 34
The small number of women defendants in the domestic violence and
homicide cases discussed supra, combined with the differential treatment
of male and female defendants generally, lends support to the argument
that women are treated with leniency in the criminal justice system. 35 The
most common explanations feminist criminologists give for such
differences in punishment between men and women are the chivalry theory
and the paternalism theory.36 Chivalry theory posits that men are unwilling
to harm women or to believe that a woman could be capable of
criminality. 37  The paternalism theory states that women are seen as
childlike and in need of protection and guidance, and therefore cannot be
held fully responsible for their wrongful acts.38 Both theories "assume that
judges have a benevolent or condescending attitude towards women and
believe women defendants are in need of guidance and protection from the
harshness and stigma associated with prison sentences."3 9 Many studies
support that "wherever discretionary decisions are made, women are less
likely than men to be detected, arrested, charged, convicted, and
33. See Alan Dershowitz, Moral Judgment: Does the Abuse Excuse Threaten Our Legal
System?, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 775, 779 (2000) (reviewing JAMES Q.WILSON, MORAL
JUDGMENT (1998)).
34. See LANGAN & DAWSON, supra note 30, at 3 tbls. 5, 15. 71% of women and 69% of
men charged with spousal homicide in the study counties during 1988 were arrested for
first-degree murder. Id. at 3 tbl.15. Of those who went to trial (rather than pleading guilty
or having the charges dropped) 70% of wives and 68% of husbands had been arrested for
first-degree murder. Id. at 6 tbl.1 1. Of those convicted at trial, 37% of husbands and 32%
of wives were convicted of first-degree murder; 10% of husbands and 6% of wives were
found guilty of negligent manslaughter (called involuntary manslaughter in California). Id.
at 6 tbl. 12. For second-degree murder and nonnegligent manslaughter (voluntary
manslaughter), women were convicted at a slightly higher rate than men: 33% versus 30%
for second-degree murder and 29% versus 22% for voluntary manslaughter. Id.
35. Sergio Herzog & Shaul Oreg, Chivalry and the Moderating Effect of Ambivalent
Sexism: Individual Diferences in Crime Seriousness Judgments, 42 LAw & SocY REV. 45,
45 (2008).
36. R. Keith Crew, Sex Differences in Criminal Sentencing: Chivalry or Patriarchy? 8
JUST. Q. 59, 60 (1991); Elizabeth Rapaport, Some Questions About Gender and the Death
Penalty, 20 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 501, 508 (1990) [hereinafter Rapaport, Questions].
37. Crew, supra note 36, at 60.
38. Id.; see also FRANCES HEIDENSOHN, WOMEN AND CRIME 45-46 (2d ed. 1995) (citing
a study in which Scottish sheriffs reported that women who were law breakers were "more
mad than bad" and were "bad mothers," who would benefit from time in the women's
prison, which they described as being comfortable and safe and full of "kindly paternal
discipline").
39. See Wendy Keller, Disparate Treatment of Spouse Murder Defendants, 6 S. CAL.
REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 255, 269 (1996).
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sentenced," 40 and that when women are sentenced, they receive "milder
sentences than men." 4 1 Further, there are indications that women are less
likely than men to actually be executed once they are sentenced to death.42
Some researchers have posited that factors such as gender-based family
roles,4 3 sexual orientation,4 and race4 5 may affect sentencing differences
between men and women. These findings suggest that not all women enjoy
equal access to the benefits of chivalrous or paternalistic benevolence.
Indeed, many argue that the extent to which women adhere to gendered
expectations directly affects the degree of leniency or harshness they
expenence.
Some data indicate that, at least in certain circumstances, women who
are convicted of spousal homicide may be subjected to relatively harsher
treatment than their male counterparts. A popular theory for explaining
why some women receive harsh treatment when others do not is the "evil
woman" theory.4 6 The "evil woman" theory has been used to explain why,
in a system that often seems reluctant to sentence women harshly, some
women still receive very harsh sentences. 47 Within the framework of this
theory, "evil" women are those who commit "shockingly 'unladylike'
behavior, [which] allow[s] the sentencing judges and juries to put aside any
image of them as 'the gentler sex."' 4 8  The defendant is dehumanized,
allowing the jury to condemn her to die, and vindicating the death penalty's
role as "social cleansing tool." 4 9  "[E]xecuting these socially deviant
women provides a way for society to set the outer limits which define
40. Herzog & Oreg, supra note 35 at 47.
41. Id.
42. Elizabeth Rapaport, Equality of the Damned: The Execution of Women on the Cusp
of the 21st Century, 26 Omo N. U. L. REv. 581, 584 (2000) [hereinafter Rapaport, Equality
of the Damned].
43. Gayle S. Bickle & Ruth D. Peterson, The Impact of Gender-Based Family Roles on
Criminal Sentencing, 38 Soc. PROBS. 372 (1991) (reinforcing studies showing that marriage
and motherhood affect sentencing differentials between men and women-interestingly, the
relevant factors correlating with leniency also vary by race). In this study of forgery cases,
marriage was correlated with harsher sentences for both Black and white men, as well as
white women, whereas it was correlated with more lenient sentences for Black women. Id.
44. See Kathryn Ann Farr, Defeminizing and Dehumanizing Female Murderers:
Depictions of Lesbians on Death Row, 11 WOMEN & CRIM. JUST. 49 (2000) (finding that
lesbians are overrepresented in capital cases and that prosecutors depict these women as
"manly and man-hating" as a strategy for gaining conviction and death sentences).
45. See Sharon Angela Allard, Rethinking Battered Woman Syndrome: A Black Feminist
Perspective, I UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 191, 196-97 (1991) (asserting that Black and poor
women are less able to successfully employ Battered Woman Syndrome arguments in front
of juries who are likely to see them as aggressive and angry, and therefore disbelieve their
claims of timidity and fear).
46. Rapaport, Questions, supra note 36, at 512-13.
47. Id.
48. Melinda E. O'Neill, The Gender Gap Argument: Exploring the Disparity of
Sentencing Women to Death, 25 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 213, 221
(1999).
49. Id.
119
gender roles."50  Thus, when women behave in a "manly" way by
committing acts of violence, they forfeit the advantage conferred by
femininity.
If the chivalry and paternalism theories are accurate, one would expect
the examination of California cases to demonstrate that the sample women
were convicted of lower degrees of murder than the sample men. The "evil
woman" theory would lead us to expect women who kill in ways that are
especially egregious for women to be convicted of a more serious offense
and given a longer sentence than women who behave in more acceptably
feminine ways. Thus, coldness or indifference, extreme violence, or acting
for personal or financial gain would likely result in more harsh treatment
than would a woman who could show bad behavior on the part of her
partner, and attempts to find other resolutions to relationship conflicts.
III. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MEN'S AND
WOMEN'S CRIMES
One of the advantages long assumed to be accessible to men who kill
their wives is the heat of passion defense, which allows a man who has
killed his wife to claim that her infidelity caused him to become enraged
and kill her.5 1  A successful heat of passion defense would result in a
conviction for voluntary manslaughter rather than murder.52 In contrast, at
common law a woman who killed her husband was tried not for mere
murder, but for petit treason, punished by death. 5 The distinction between
the two offenses is based on the traditional roles of husbands and wives.
Under the common law, wives' bad acts were generally attributable to their
husbands and husbands were allowed to "correct" their wives.54 Assault or
murder by a wife against her husband, rather than being a crime against an
equal, was a form of treason because of the husband's legal dominance
over his wife.55
While crimes by men and women are no longer codified differently,
men and women do appear to offend differently. Contrary to what the
numbers cited above seem to indicate, some researchers have found
evidence that there is no difference at all between men and women's
treatment under the law, at least in cases of homicide. Rather, women
50. O'Neill, supra note 48, at 221.
51. Carolyn B. Ramsey, Intimate Homicide: Gender and Crime Control, 1880-1920, 77
U. COLO. L. REv. 101, 103 (2006) [hereinafter Ramsey, Intimate Homicide]
52. See Keller, supra note 39, at 263.
53. This offense also existed under California law. CAL. PENAL CODE § 191 (West 2010)
(abolishing common law petit treason in 1872).
54. Shelby A.D. Moore, Battered Woman Syndrome: Selling the Shadow to Support the
Substance, 38 How. L.J. 297, 304 (1995) (citing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
444 (Chitty ed., 1900)).
55. Carolyn B. Ramsey, Provoking Change: Comparative Insights on Feminist
Homicide Law Reform, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 33 107 n.a2 (2010).
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receive shorter sentences than men due to legal factors that indicate that
these women are, in fact, less serious offenders. Women convicted of
homicide frequently have no prior criminal record, and commit homicide
under circumstances considered less serious according to controlling
statutes.56 For instance, women are less likely to have prior convictions,
and any prior convictions are unlikely to be for a prior violent offense."
Further, felony murder statutes account for a high percentage of men on
death row, but a much lower percentage of women.5 8 Victor Streib argues
that a number of aggravating factors contemplated by state capital
homicide statutes tend to affect men more than women as they tend to be
geared toward punishing behavior that is more typically male. 59
While men and women both use physical force in altercations within
intimate relationships,o there are distinctions between male on female
violence and female on male violence. Male aggressors are more likely to
seriously harm their female partners, 6 and women are far more likely to be
murdered by an intimate partner than are men.62 Further, statistics such as
those cited infra regarding weapon use may point to the size differential
between women and men. Paradoxically, weapon use by women may be
an indicator of self-defense or of previous altercations preceding the violent
incident.64 Such an inquiry is likely to be highly fact-specific. However,
because using a deadly or dangerous weapon makes a crime legally more
serious, 6 5it is important to analyze the ways in which use of deadly or
dangerous weapons may be, in some contexts, more deserving of leniency.
56. See Victor L. Streib, Rare and Inconsistent: The Death Penalty for Women, 33
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 609, 616-17 (2006) (describing typical aggravating factors in death
penalty statutes that are more likely to apply to male than female defendants, such as felony
murder and prior convictions).
57. Id.; see also HEIDENSOHN, supra note 38, at 44 (citing English data).
58. Streib, supra note 56, at 617.
59. Id. at 616-20.
60. See generally SMITH & FAROLE, JR., supra note 25, at 1. (finding both male and
female defendants in intimate partner violence cases and both male and female parties found
guilty).
61. See CALLIE MARIE RENNISON & SARAH WELCHANS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE 2 (2000), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty-pbdetail&iid=608 (finding that 68% of all intimate
partner violence against men and 65% of all intimate partner violence against women
involved simple assault, the least serious form of violence addressed by the study).
62. SHANNAN CATALANO ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
FEMALE VICTIMS OF VIOLENCE 3 (2009), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfn?ty=-
pbdetail&iid=2020 (finding that in 2007, females were twice as likely to be killed by an
intimate partner as were males). While an analysis of the role of race in male-female
sentencing decisions is beyond the scope of this Note, it is worth mentioning that Black
females were four times as likely as white females to be murdered by a boy- or girlfriend,
and twice as likely as white females to be killed by a spouse. Id.
63. See infra Part V.B.1.
64. See CAROL SMART, WOMEN, CRIME, AND CRIMINALITY: A FEMINIST CRITIQUE 17
(1977).
65. See, e.g., California weapons enhancement statutes cited infra Section IV.C.
121
Women's crimes are less likely than men's to be violent, and they are
also less likely to be committed against strangers or acquaintances; while
most men's victims are strangers, women's victims are usually family
members.6 6  Killings of family members (excluding children) tend to be
subject to a "domestic discount" and are less likely to result in a capital
sentence.67 The death penalty is a rare consequence of domestic homicide,
no matter the sex of either offender or victim. 68 Examining offenses for
which women and men are condemned to die provides an interesting
contrast. According to Elizabeth Rapaport, "hot-blooded killing, striking
out in anger at one who has injured or inflamed his or her killer, is regarded
as less reprehensible than premeditated or predatory killing" in the law
generally. 69 In her study of homicide cases in six states, from 1978 to
1989, Rapaport found that of men sentenced to death, fewer than 12% were
sentenced to die for domestic homicides, defined as murders of family
members or intimates.70 Of the women sent to death row during the same
period, nearly half were domestic killers.71
Comparing men's and women's crimes overall further illustrates the
differences between the ways in which men and women offend overall (or
at least the crimes for which they are convicted). Women who go to prison
are much less likely than men to be imprisoned for violent crime. In
California, 56.1% of men in prison as of June 30, 2009, were incarcerated
for crimes against the person, e.g. assault, battery, sexual assault and
homicide. 2 In contrast, a third of women were in prison for crimes against
the person, and 35.4% of incarcerated women were those convicted of
property crimes, e.g. theft, burglary, and fraud.
However, among prisoners serving sentences for crimes against the
person, a higher proportion of women than men are serving sentences for
66. TRACY L. SNELL & DANIELLE C. MORTON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, WOMEN IN PRISON: SURVEY OF STATE PRISON INMATES, 1991, at 3 (1994),
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty-pbdetail&iid=569. Intimates are
typically defined as current and former spouses and significant others. See id. This study
breaks perpetrators into the categories of intimates, relatives, well-known non-intimate non-
family members, acquaintances, those known by sight only, and strangers. Id.
67. Elizabeth Rapaport, Capital Murder and the Domestic Discount: A Study of Capital
Domestic Murder in the Post-Furman Era, 49 SMU L. REV. 1507, 1508 (1996) [hereinafter
Rapaport, Domestic Discount].
68. Elizabeth Rapaport, The Death Penalty and the Domestic Discount, in THE PUBLIC
NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE 224, 224 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk
eds., 1994) [hereinafter Rapaport, Death Penalty].
69. Id. at 224.
70. Id. at 225.
71. Id.
72. PRISON CENSUS DATA, supra note 23, at tbl.3.
73. Id. at tbls.2 & 3. While the data does not explicitly describe which crimes belong to
which categories, they were verified by checking combined figures for related offenses in
Table 2 against figures given for each category in Table 3. Personal crime includes offenses
such as assault, rape, and homicide.
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homicide. Murder and voluntary manslaughter account for just over a
tenth (12.2%) of women's prison sentences overall, but comprise more than
a third (36.1%) of women's sentences for crimes against the person.75 In
comparison, homicide accounts for fully 16.8% of men's offenses overall,
but less than one-third (29.9%) of men's sentences for personal crime. 76 in
other words, women are less likely than men to be incarcerated for
violence, but among those incarcerated for personal crime, women are
more likely than men to have committed homicide.
At first glance, these numbers appear to contradict any notion that
women commit less serious crimes than men-if homicide is the most
serious criminal offense, and it makes up such a large proportion of
women's violent crimes, does that not point to women's propensity for
violence? A few caveats place these figures in context. First, these
proportions refer to very different numbers of offenders in each category.
26,320 men were incarcerated for homicide in California as of June 30,
2009, as opposed to only 1351 women.7 7  Women comprised
approximately 6.5% of the California prison population as of June 30,
2009,78 and make up less than 5% of those prisoners incarcerated for
homicide.79 Second, the category of crimes against the person includes sex
crimes, for which men are much more likely to be incarcerated than are
women-less than 1% of Californians jailed for a sex offense are women.80
74. See PRISON CENSUS DATA, supra note 23, at tbl.3. Defined as murder and
nonnegligent homicide. See, e.g., CATALANO ET AL., supra note 62, at 7. In the terms of the
California statutory definitions this includes first- and second-degree murder and voluntary
manslaughter. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 2010) (defining murder as "the unlawful
killing of a human being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought"); CAL. PENAL CODE § 189
(West 2010) (defining first- and second-degree homicide); PENAL § 192(a) (defining
voluntary manslaughter as "the unlawful killing of a human being without malice ... upon a
sudden quarrel or heat of passion").
75. See PRISON CENSUS DATA, supra note 23, at tbl.3. Vehicular homicide convictions
are excluded from discussion of homicide for the purposes of this Note.
76. See id. at tbls.2 & 3.
77. See id. at tbl.2 (showing 11,925 men in prison for first-degree murder, 11,322 for
second-degree murder, and 3073 for manslaughter, totaling 26,320 men incarcerated for
homicide). The same table shows 497 women in prison for first-degree murder, 588 for
second-degree murder, and 266 for manslaughter, totaling 1351 women incarcerated for
homicide. See id.
78. See id. As of June 30, 2009, 11,033 women were in prison in California, out of a
total prison population of 167,981 people. Id.
79. See id. 1351 women are in prison for homicide, out of a total of 27,671 prisoners
convicted of homicide. Id.
80. See PRISON CENSUS DATA, supra note 23, at tbls.2 & 3. Specifically, 15,241 men are
in prison for sex offenses including rape, lewd acts with a child under the age of fourteen,
oral copulation, sodomy, penetration with a foreign object, and other sex offenses. Id. This
figure represents 9.7% of men's crimes overall, and 17.3% of men's crimes against the
person. Id. In contrast, only 100 women are in prison for sex crimes, which represents less
than 1% of women's crimes of conviction in this population and only 2.6% of women's
crimes against the person. Id. Of the total number of those incarcerated for a sex offense,
less than 1% were women. Id.
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Third, while men's victims are most likely to be male acquaintances and
strangers, women are still more likely to be killed by an intimate or former
intimate than anyone else.8 ' Finally, while the majority of women's
victims are intimates or family members, as of 2007, women still made up
the large majority of victims of intimate homicide in the United States.82
Thus, while the domestic discount affects both men and women's
sentences, it arguably has more of an impact on men's sentences. Rapaport
argues this discount demonstrates the relative seriousness with which the
murder of a supposedly trusting partner is viewed as opposed to the murder
of a stranger or adversary.83 Applying the "evil woman" theory, one would
argue that the reason so many women on death row are there for domestic
crimes is because they betrayed their families' trust. This perspective
further contends these crimes are offenses not just against individual
victims, but against the concept of motherhood and femininity.
An increase in arrests and convictions of women in recent decades has
raised questions regarding whether women are becoming more criminal or
- 84-
violent. Certainly reliance on arrest and conviction rates as an accurate
reflection of incidence of crime would support this contention. Darrell
Steffenmeier, et al., found that over the same twenty-three year period,
while the Uniform Crime Reports showed an increase in the arrests and
prosecutions of women nationwide, the National Crime Victimization
Survey showed no increase in self-reports of victimizations by female
perpetrators. Indeed, between 1993 and 2007, while the overall rate at
which women were murdered fell more than the rate for men did (a 34%
decrease for women compared to a 30% decrease for men), men's murders
81. CATALANO ET AL. supra note 62, at 3. "In 2007, 24% of female homicide victims
were killed by a spouse or ex-spouse; 21% were killed by a boyfriend or girlfriend; and 19%
were killed by another family member." Id. Thus, 45% of homicides of women in 2007
were by a current or former intimate. Id.
82. Id. "Females made up 70% of victims killed by an intimate partner in 2007, a
proportion that has changed very little since 1993." Id. Further, "[flemales were killed by
intimate partners at twice the rate of males." Id.
83. Rapaport, Domestic Discount, supra note 67.
84. See, e.g., Bonnie Erb6, Are Women Becoming More Violent?, POLITICs DAiLY (NOV.
13, 2009), http://www.politicsdaily.com/2009/11/13/are-women-becoming-more-violent/
(discussing videos of female on female violence, as well as female aggression in a college
soccer game that resulted in a suspension of a player); see also Sophie Goodchild, Women
Are More Violent, Says Study, THE INDEPENDENT, (Nov. 12, 2000), http://www.independent.
co.uk/news/uk/home-news/women-are-more-violent-says-study-622388.html (discussing a
study showing that women are more violent in interpersonal relationships with men than
previously thought, and quoting a researcher as saying that women are more violent in
Western nations where "they were 'economically emancipated' and therefore not afraid of
ending a relationship").
85. Darrell Steffenmeier et al., Gender Gap Trends for Violent Crimes, 1980 to 2003: A
UCR-NCVS Comparison, I FEMINIST CRIMINOLOGY 72 (2006) (finding that while the
Uniform Crime Reports indicate that arrests of women increased over the twenty-three-year
period examined, victimization reports did not change regarding proportion of victims
reporting violent offenses committed by women).
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by intimate partners fell at a greater rate than that of women murdered by
intimate partners (36% versus 26%)." The number of men killed by
intimate partners was already much lower than the number of women killed
by intimate partners; in 1993, 1100 men and 2200 women were killed by
intimate partners. In 2007, 700 men and 1640 women were killed by
intimate partners. In 2007 the number of women killed by intimate
partners was greater than the number of men killed by intimate partners in
1993. Put another way, in 2000, a third of homicides of women were
committed by intimate partners, as compared to less than a tenth of those
committed against men.90 Further, in 2001, nonfatal violence against men
was committed by an intimate partner only 3% of the time, but intimate
partners committed 20% of nonfatal violence against women.91 There is
evidence that some means of intervention or resources that allow women to
leave their violent partners, such as access to welfare benefits and
mandatory arrest policies, reduce the likelihood of domestic homicide.92
Some intervention methods may provoke retaliatory violence, such as
prosecuting violations of protective orders without providing actual
protection of women with protective orders.
It is also informative to compare the tendency of men and women to
use weapons in intimate partner violence cases. In one national study of
nonfatal intimate partner violence cases, women were found to be more
likely than male defendants to use a weapon during an incident of intimate
partner violence, twice as likely to use a knife or sharp object, and three
times more likely to use a blunt object. 94 Men used weapons in only a
quarter of intimate partner violence cases, whereas women used weapons in
41% of intimate partner violence cases. 95 Men more often used "other"
weapons, including personal weapons, defined as hands, feet, and fists. 96
86. CATALANO ET AL. supra note 62, at 3-4.
87. Id. at 4.
88. Id. at 2.
89. Id. at 2.
90. CALLIE MARIE RENNISON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS CRIME
DATA BRIEF: INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE, 1993-2001, at 1 (2003), available at http://
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ipv01 .pdf.
91. Id.
92. Laura Dugan et al., Exposure Reduction or Retaliation? The Effects of Domestic
Violence Resources on Intimate-Partner Homicide, 37 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 169, 190-92
(2003) (finding that decreasing access to welfare benefits is linked to higher rates of
intimate homicide of African-American males, and mandatory arrest policies are linked to a
decrease in homicides of married women across examined racial categories).
93. Id. at 192.
94. SMITH & FAROLE, JR., supra note 25, at 3.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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Other studies have found that men are more likely to kill their female
partners using personal weapons than vice versa.97
Domestic homicides may be a very different phenomenon than other
types of crimes. Some have argued that women who kill their husbands, at
least in the case of abused wives, differ significantly from the general
population of women in prison. 98 Some studies show that battered women
who kill their husbands tend not to have prior convictions, and they tend to
be better-educated, older, and are more likely to be white than the average
female inmate. 99 Additional evidence suggests that women who kill their
partners tend to kill for different reasons than do men. A survey of women
and men on death row for domestic homicide in the late 1970s found that
12% of the men and 48% of the women were there for domestic
homicide. 00 Of those convicted for domestic killings, fully 69% of the
women and only 13% of men were found to have committed the murder for
financial gain.'0o On the other hand, 48% of the men and only 8% of the
women were found to have killed their partner or a proxy victim in
retaliation for their partner leaving them. 102 These figures may be seen to
comport with stereotypes about "gold-digging" women, or to reflect the
reality of female dependence on male financial support; similarly,
separation killings by men reflect the notion that men who kill their family
members do so to exert control or in anger at having their control and
authority flouted.
Separation murders are of particular concern to advocates for battered
women. Many factors affect whether a woman leaves an abusive partner,
including personal motivations, children, family support, finances and
severity of abuse. 103 However, fear of retaliatory violence is a very serious
concern that has been shown to deter women both from reporting violence
and from leaving. According to one researcher, "[t]hese separation cases
differ from stereotypical domestic killings that flow out of arguments in
that they are planned and followed the dissolution of a household or
97. See, e.g., LANGAN & DAWSON, supra note 30, at 2; see also CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS CENTER, HOMICIDE IN CALIFORNIA: 2007, at 19 available at ag.ca.gov/cjsc/
publications/homicide/hmO7/preface.pdf (showing a higher proportion of female homicide
victims killed via personal weapon than male homicide victims-7.9% versus 4.8%).
98. ELIZABETH LEONARD, CONVICTED SURVIVORS: THE IMPRISONMENT OF BATTERED
WOMEN WHO ILL 59 (2002).
99. Id. at 67-68.
100. Rapaport, Domestic Discount, supra note 67, at 1517.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See, e.g., DEFENDING OUR LIVES (Cambridge Documentary Films, 1983) (showing
women convicted of spousal homicide discussing staying with their husbands out of hope
they could work the relationship out, belief that abuse was a normal part of relationships, or
lack of personal resources; similarly, at least one woman attempted to leave in order to
protect her son).
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relationship by weeks or months."'0 Other studies have found that women
are most at risk of being murdered by a husband or boyfriend when they
leave that partner.105 This phenomenon is an often cited statistic to point
out one of the significant barriers to a woman successfully leaving an
abusive relationship, and serves as a powerful response to the question
"why doesn't she leave?"
Thus, women and men are victimized by intimate partners at different
rates; women are more frequently the victims of fatal intimate partner
violence, and women and men commit intimate partner homicide at
different rates. Intimate partner homicide makes up a higher proportion of
the homicides committed by women than of those committed by men.
Further, while frequency of intimate partner homicide has dropped in
recent decades, the proportion of homicides of women attributable to
intimate partners has remained roughly the same. Thus, despite an overall
decrease in homicide rates in the United States in recent decades, intimate
partner homicide remains a significant threat to women and to a lesser
extent, to men. For this reason, it remains pertinent to investigate how
juries view women who kill their husbands, in particular, whether and how
women's claims of spousal abuse affect the jury's decision regarding
culpability.
IV. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BATTERED WOMAN
SYNDROME AND THE JURY
A. BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME
Battered women's advocates have worked to counteract bias against
women generally and battered women specifically; "[t]he question 'why
didn't she leave?' shapes both social and legal inquiry on battering; much
of the legal reliance on academic expertise on battered women has
developed in order to address this question." 10 6 A woman who is abused
by her husband may stay for any number of reasons: she may be afraid of
retaliatory violence, she may not have the financial means to support
herself, she may have left in the past only to have her husband come after
her and force her to return.10 7
104. Rapaport, Domestic Discount, supra note 67, at 1518.
105. Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of
Separation, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1, 5-6 (1991), in THE LEGAL RESPONSE TO VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN 165 (Karen J. Maschke, ed., 1997); see also RENNISON & WELCHANS, supra note
61, at 3 (finding that being divorced or separated were associated with higher rates of
intimate partner victimization).
106. Id. at 5.
107. Shelby A.D. Moore, Battered Woman Syndrome: Selling the Shadow to Support the
Substance, 38 How. L.J. 297, 306 (1995) (relating Del Martin's 1975 study finding that
women stayed with battering husbands due to social views that abuse was normal, flaws in
the criminal justice system, economic pressures, fear of being unable to support their
children, and fear that leaving would invite more dangerous repercussions than staying).
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In 1979, psychologist Lenore Walker first wrote about Battered
Woman Syndrome, which she intended to serve as an explanation for why
women stay in abusive relationships and how they then come to kill their
abusers. 108 Walker conducted a series of interviews with women in shelters
which she said revealed the battering relationship as revolving around "the
cycle of violence."' 09 According to Walker's theory, the first phase of this
cycle consists of tension-building, marked by "minor" battering incidents
by the abuser while the victim attempts to keep peace by behaving in a
submissive and conciliatory way. "0 Next, there is an acute battering act-
an explosive incident in which the abuser channels tension that
accumulated in the first phase into severe violence against the victim. "'
Finally, this incident is followed by a honeymoon period that lasts until the
tension begins building again.112 Eventually, according to Walker, the
victim develops learned helplessness, a behavior first observed by Martin
Seligman.113  Seligman reported on the behavior of dogs shocked at
seemingly arbitrary intervals until they would refuse to leave their cages
even when the door was left open and shocks ceased altogether. 114
According to Walker, like those dogs the battering victim loses the ability
to discern any options for leaving outside of either her own death or that of
her abuser.115 Continued increase in the severity of attacks may cause her
to reasonably believe that she must kill her abuser in self-defense." 6
Battered Woman Syndrome gained prominence in the 1980s and 1990s
as it was introduced in at least some trials of women accused of murdering
their spouses.117 In 1992, the California legislature amended the Evidence
Code to include an explicit provision allowing for the admittance of
See also In re: Walker, 147 Cal. App. 4th 533, 538 (2007), discussed infra at note 268.
Walker was attempting to leave her husband after he threatened to kill her when he came
home and confronted her with a gun. Id. at 539-40. See also DEFENDING OuR LIVES
(Cambridge Documentary Films, 1983). Sarah Buel, Assistant District Attorney for Suffolk
County Domestic Violence Unit, tells of leaving an abusive husband in New York and
fleeing to New Hampshire, only to have him come after her and take her by force from a
laundromat while she pleaded with the other people present to call the police. Id. at 12:00-
13:08. Buel tells how her husband simply told the others present that he was her husband,
come to take her home, and "nobody moved." Id.
108. Jill E. Adams, Unlocking Liberty: Is California's Habeas Law the Key to Freeing
Unjustly Imprisoned Battered Women?, 19 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 217, 223 (2004).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 223-25.
111. Adams, supra note 108, at 224.
112. Id.
113. David Faigman, Note, The Battered Woman Syndrome and Self-Defense: A Legal
andEmpirical Dissent, 72 VA. L. REV. 619, 629-30 (1986).
114. Id. at 630; Adams, supra note 108, at 224.
115. Faigman, supra note 114,.at 627; Adams, supra note 108 at 224.
116. Faigman, supra note 114, at 627; Adams, supra note 108 at 224.
117. See, e.g., Faigman, supra note 114 at 619-20 n.6 (1986) (citing to appellate cases
between 1979 and 1986 evaluating the appropriateness of Battered Woman Syndrome
evidence to support self-defense claims by women who killed their partners).
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Battered Woman Syndrome expert testimony in certain trials.' 18 In 2002,
the legislature added a provision to the Code that allowed people to file
habeas corpus petitions if they were disallowed the right to introduce expert
testimony on Battered Woman Syndrome and it was probable that inclusion
such evidence would have resulted in a different outcome at trial.ll 9 Later,
both statutes were amended to substitute "Intimate Partner Battering and its
Effects" for "Battered Woman Syndrome," though the rules remained
otherwise unchanged. 120
Many scholars, activists and advocates on all sides of the debate have
criticized the use and codification of The Effects of Intimate Partner
Battering (formerly known as Battered Woman Syndrome). 12 1 It has been
criticized as junk science produced by improper methodology, 122 as pro-
moting "victimhood" over responsibility, 123 and as both reinforcing sex
stereotypes and only benefitting certain (white, middle class, and hetero-
sexual) women. 12 4 Indeed,
[while] battered woman's syndrome furthers the interest of
some battered women, the theory incorporates stereotypes of
limited applicability concerning how a woman would and,
indeed, should react to battering. To successfully defend
herself, a battered woman needs to convince a jury that she is a
"normal" woman-weak, passive, and fearful. If the battered
woman deviates from these characteristics, the jury may not
associate her situation with that of the stereotypical battered
woman. 125
118. CAL. EvID. CODE § 1107 (West 2010).
119. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1473.5 (West 2010).
120. Adams, supra note 108, at 225.
121. Intimate partner battering is the term often preferred by domestic violence advocates.
See id. at 224-25 n.42 (citing People v. Humphrey, 921 P.2d 1, 7 n. 3 (Cal. 1996), in which
the California Supreme Court notes the objections of domestic violence advocates to the use
of Battered Woman Syndrome (BWS)). In 1991, the California Legislature provided for the
introduction of BWS evidence without a Daubert hearing, and in 2000 the provision was
updated to refer to The Effects of Intimate Partner Battering. The change was merely a
degendering of the provision-the underlying statute was substantially unchanged. See
Adams, supra note 108, at 225.
122. See David L. Faigman, supra note 114, at 619 (criticizing Lenore Walker's
methodology and urging courts to "allow juries to consider valid social science research and
the battered woman's own history of abuse in evaluating her self-defense claim").
123. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 31.
124. See Allard, supra note 45 (asserting that Black and poor women are less able to
successfully employ BWS arguments in front of juries who are likely to see them as
aggressive and angry, and therefore to disbelieve their claims of timidity and fear); id. at
196 n. 15 (discussing the "Sapphire" stereotype of a "shrill, nagging, hostile, and aggressive
Black woman").
125. Allard, supra note 45 at 193-94.
129
While Allard makes this assertion on behalf of Blackl2 6 women, the
same claim can be and has been made in regard to other marginalized
groups, such as transgender individuals and individuals in same-sex
relationships. 127 For instance, in People v. Mata, the prosecutor countered
Ms. Mata's claim of self-defense in killing a man she claimed was trying to
rape her by telling the jury that the victim had merely propositioned her. 128
He asserted that
[Bernina Mata] has a motive to commit this crime in that she is a
hard core lesbian, and that is why she reacted to Mr. Draheim's
behavior in this way. A normal heterosexual woman would not be
so offended by such conduct as to murder. 129
In another case in Oklahoma, in which a Black butch woman on trial
for the murder of her more feminine partner claimed self-defense, "the
State relied on sexist, racist stereotypes regarding Ms. Allen's butch
identity and masculine appearance to defeminize, dehumanize, and
prejudice her in front of the jury," and to portray her as the aggressive
"man" in the relationship. 130 Allen's butchness and Blackness were used to
cast her as an aggressive Black male and allowed the jury not just to
convict her, but to sentence her to death.13' Mata and Allen's cases
illustrate Allard's point: not all women have equal access to the stereotypes
on which Battered Woman Syndrome rests-women who are deviant or
nonnormative in other ways may face additional barriers to benefiting from
the frame Battered Woman Syndrome establishes. If a woman is subject to
stereotypes of strength, aggression, or hostility, she may not succeed in
convincing a jury that she was afraid for her life, because the jury may be
more likely to see her as self-sufficient-more able to defend herself or
leave-than a woman who they believe to be meek and docile.
According to the latter critique, the effectiveness of Battered Woman
Syndrome evidence may be contingent on the effects of the "evil woman"
theory. 132  Women who do not have access to frames of hegemonic
126. Allard follows the convention of capitalizing "Black," identifying Black and other
"minority" group descriptors as indicating cultural groups rather than describing skin tone.
See id. at 192 n.5. "Inherent devaluation is communicated by the term 'black,' and so the
capitalization also seeks to empower the cultural group." Id. This essay will follow her lead
in this respect.
127. See Joey L. Mogul, The Dykier, The Butcher, The Better: The State's Use of
Homophobia and Sexism to Execute Women in the United States, 8 N.Y. CITy L. REv. 473
(2005) (describing prosecutorial use of homophobic and sexist perceptions of lesbians to
dehumanize women on trial for murder).
128. Id. at 485.
129. Id.
130. Mogul, supra note 128, at 490, (citing Allen v. State, 871 P.2d 79 (Okla. Crim. App.
1994)).
131. Id.
132. See Rapaport, Questions, supra note 36, at 512-13.
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femininity may also not be able to access the benefits of Battered Woman
Syndrome evidence effectively. If Battered Woman Syndrome rests on or
its use invokes the same stereotypes that underlie judicial chivalry and the
evil woman perspective, falling on the wrong side of the femininity divide
could both bar a woman from benefiting either from formal evidence of the
former or the informal bias of the latter.
B. THE JURY
In the American system, criminal defendants have the right to trial by a
jury drawn from a representative sample of the community.133 At trial,
issues of law are decided by the judge and issues of fact are found by the
jury.134 The judge rules on the admission of evidence-admitted evidence
is reviewed by the jury to determine whether the prosecution has proven
beyond a reasonable doubt the charges it has brought against the
defendant.13 ' At the close of the trial, the judge instructs the jury on the
law; jurors must consider the evidence presented and the court's
instructions to determine whether the crimes alleged were committed. 136
Juries are not informed of the sentence associated with the offense or
offenses charged. 137 In capital cases, if the jury returns a guilty verdict, a
second hearing is held in which the jury determines whether the offender
will be sentenced to die. 138
Jurors try individual cases, not theories of law, and seemingly disparate
sentences or convictions within a handful or even a large group of cases are
not necessarily reflective of an overall trend. Studies have demonstrated
that jurors are not, as once thought, blank slates who can absorb the facts of
a case and the instructions given by the judge and come to a legally correct
conclusion without referencing any external information. 139 In one study,
juror verdicts under two different insanity instructions, the Model Penal
133. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975) ("The unmistakable import of this
Court's opinions since 1940 . . . is that the selection of a petit jury from a representative
cross section of the community is an essential component of the Sixth Amendment right to a
jury trial.").
134. See CALJIC 1.00 (defining the judge as finder of law and jury as finder of fact).
135. See Neil P. Cohen, The Timing of Jury Instructions, 67 TENN. L. REV. 681, 683-84
(2000) (discussing the judge's instructions to the jury on evidence to be considered in
deliberations); see also Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury's
Constitutional Role in an Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33, 79 (2003).
"[T]he prosecutor must prove the facts under the rules of evidence and with the burden of
the reasonable doubt standard." Id.
136. Cohen, supra note 136, at 682.
137. Barkow, supra, note 136. "[M]ost jurisdictions forbid judges and parties from
instructing the jury about penalties." Id.
138. See e.g. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.1 (West 2010) (providing for a separate hearing
regarding penalty in capital cases after a determination of guilt and finding of special
circumstances have been reached).
139. See Vicki L. Smith, Prototypes in the Courtroom: Lay Representations of Legal
Concepts, 61 J. OF PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 857 (1991) [hereinafter Smith,
Prototypes].
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Code test 4 0 and the traditional common law M'Naghten rule1 4 1 "[were]
indistinguishable from those given an 'insanity' instruction that specifies
no definition of the term."1 4 2  This indicates that despite the different
requirements of the rules, jurors have a preexisting idea of what "insanity"
constitutes, and apply that concept in making determinations at trial, even
after being instructed on the requirements of the law.
According to Vicki Smith, jurors determine whether a crime has
occurred not by examining the facts presented at trial and applying them to
the legal test provided by the court, but by determining whether the
incident(s) described fit their prototype of the crime.14 3 Further, "jurors lay
construct of insanity shifts unpredictably as experimenters alter the facts.
The considerations that strike jurors as decisive in one case turn out to be
irrelevant, or decidedly less important than some other previously
irrelevant consideration, in the next case."'" If jurors have predetermined
notions of what actions or attributes constitute a particular type of offense,
what does this mean for women and men who kill their spouses? Perhaps
verdicts in such cases are determined not by the instructions of the judge,
but the extent to which the victim and offender in each case fit the jurors'
notions of who is deserving of protection and who has behaved in ways that
require censure. This would align with both the picture painted by Allard
and that painted by advocates for Battered Woman Syndrome evidence. If
jurors need to be convinced not that a decedent gave the defendant
reasonable fear of imminent danger of great bodily harm or death (the legal
standard for proving self-defense), but also that he was bad and she good,
Battered Woman Syndrome evidence makes sense as a strategy. While
evidence of past abuse alone would demonstrate that the decedent behaved
violently in the past (where such is true), Battered Woman Syndrome
evidence allows a defense attorney to argue that her client was insensate
with fear brought on by repeated and ongoing mistreatment-not in terms
140. The Model Penal Code terms insanity a "mental disease or defect excluding
responsibility," and defines it as follows:
[a] person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such
conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity
either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law.
Model Penal Code 4.01(1) (1985).
141. The M'Naghten standard comes from a House of Lords case in which the court
declared that the defendant could be found guilty by reason of insanity if:
at the time of committing the act, the defendant was labouring under such a
defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and
quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know
what he was doing was wrong.
8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843). See Dan M. Kahan, Lay Perceptions ofJustice Vs. Criminal
Law Doctrine: A False Dichotomy?, 28 HOFSTRA L. REv. 793 (2000).
142. Id. at 795.
143. Smith, Prototypes, supra note 140, at 869.
144. Kahan, supra note 142, at 795.
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of previous discrete incidents, but by a constant state of fear contextualized
by the cycle of violence testimony. Further, Allard's critique has bearing
here as well-if jurors must be convinced that a defendant fits the
prototype of "victim" and that prototype is culturally informed, stereotypes
of femininity and racialized aggression versus submissiveness will inform
how well the defendant succeeds in that effort.
Although jurors are instructed to follow the law as explained by the
judge, they do retain the power to nullify-that is, to decline to find the
defendant guilty despite the prosecution having proved the elements of the
crime. In the colonial era, jurors served to protect the community against
the threat of an overreaching government. 14 5 Throughout the eighteenth
century, this focus continued, complete with judges or lawyers instructing
juries that in addition to deciding facts, they must determine whether the
law should be applied. 146  Efforts to constrain the jury began in the
nineteenth century, including the doctrine of directed verdict and the advent
of detailed and specific jury instructions.14 7  While jury independence
resulted in refusal of northern courts to enforce the Fugitive Slave Act in
the nineteenth century,14 8 this same refusal to apply the law also stymied
federal efforts during Reconstruction to bring white lynch mobs and Klan
members to justice.149
While juries are no longer instructed on jury nullification, they
nevertheless retain this power. Nullification is highly disfavored and has
been described by a federal court as contrary to the oath a juror takes to
uphold the law.'5 0 Yet the standard for overturning a jury verdict is quite
high, and little can be done to remedy cases where jury nullification results
in acquittal. Part of the question in examining the treatment of men and
women in court is whether the jury will apply the law equally to parties of
either sex-if jurors truly apply notions of chivalry to women defendants,
one would expect to see nullification as one common outcome. In fact, in
the nineteenth century, women accused of killing their husbands were often
found not guilty based on tales of "physical abuse and dishonor" by male
juries.15' Though prosecutors sought the highest charge available, male
145. JOSHUA DRESSLER AND GEORGE C. THOMAS, III, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
PROSECUTING CRIME 1061 (3d ed., 2006).
146. Alan W. Scheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right to Say No, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 168,
176 (1972).
147. Id. at 177.
148. Id.; Fugitive Slave Act, ch. 60, §§ 1-10, 9 Stat. 462 (1850).
149. Albert W. Aschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the
United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 867, 890-91 (1994).
150. Irwin A. Horowitz, et al., Jury Nullification: Legal and Psychological Perspectives,
66 BROOK. L. REv. 1207, 1207 (2001) (citing United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 608
(2d Cir. 1997)).
151. Ramsey, Intimate Homicide, supra note 51, at 103 (stating "juries, which by law
were composed solely of men until the mid-twentieth century, acquitted women from all
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jurors acquitted women who showed their maltreatment by the purported
victim. 15 2 One study has shown that women arrested for spousal homicide
are more likely to be acquitted than are men, with 14% of women acquitted
at trial compared to only 2% of men.153 However, the women in the study
were less likely than the men to be prosecuted, and those that were
convicted or plead guilty tended to receive lower sentences than did the
men.154 While these contrasts could indicate chivalrous behavior across the
categories of prosecutors, judges, and juries, it is also possible that many
women in the sample presented circumstances which made their killings
legally less serious, such as by demonstrating actual, but unreasonable fear
of their male partners, or prior abuse. While prior abuse does not justify a
conviction of second-degree murder or voluntary manslaughter, it may help
the jury to see the defendant as deserving of protection or compassion.
C. HOMICIDE IN CALIFORNIA
Many of the arguments detailed above regarding chivalry are premised
on judicial discretion in sentencing. Currently in California, as with much
of the country, judges hearing murder cases have little to no discretion in
sentencing. Sentences are mandated by statute according to offense.15 5
The three homicide offenses examined here all have sentences determined
by statute. Murder is defined as "the unlawful killing of a human being, or
a fetus, with malice aforethought."' 5 6 Murder is divided into two degrees
according to intent. First-degree murder is defined by California law as
being affected by a list of specific methods, and "by any other kind of
willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing" or committed during specific
felonies.' 57 Second-degree murder is any other "unlawful killing ... with
malice aforethought" that is not either committed during specific dangerous
felonies, or is not "willful, deliberate, and premeditated."' 58  A person
convicted of first-degree murder of her spouse will receive either twenty-
five years to life, life without parole (LWOP) or the death penalty.15 9
Death or LWOP sentences are given when particular special circumstances
are found, 60 such as lying in wait,16 1 murder with poison,162 murder by
social classes or found them guilty of lesser-included offenses, crediting their stories of
physical abuse and dishonor").
152. Ramsey, Intimate Homicide, supra note 51, at 103.
153. LANGAN & DAWSON, supra note 30, at iii.
154. Id.
155. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 190(a) (West 2010) (laying out the three possible
sentences resulting from a conviction for first-degree murder).
156. Id. § 187(a).
157. Id. § 189.
158. Id.
159. Id. § 190(a).
160. PENAL § 190.2(a).
161. Id. § 190.2(a)(15).
162. Id. § 190.2(a)(19).
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torture, 1 or murder for pecuniary gain,164 to name a few. Second-degree
murder, murder that is intentional but not premeditated,' 65 earns a sentence
of fifteen years to life.166
Manslaughter is an "unlawful killing without malice."'16 7 It may be
voluntary, involuntary, or vehicular.168  This Note deals only with
voluntary manslaughter. Voluntary manslaughter, murder that is
intentional but in which malice is negated by heat of passion or sudden
16 1 70quarrel,16 9 receives a sentence of either three, six, or eleven years.
Malice may be express or implied.' 7' Express malice is "a deliberate
intention unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow creature."17 2 Implied
malice is found when "no considerable provocation appears, or when the
circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant
heart." 7 3 Thus, sufficient provocation will negate malice.
Sentences may be increased if the jury finds true enhancements. In
these cases, the most common enhancements are weapons enhancements.
A defendant may be at risk of anywhere from one year consecutive to the
murder sentence1 74 to an additional twenty-five years to life depending on
the enhancement found true.s75 Thus, a defendant may receive a conviction
of second-degree murder, but be sentenced to forty years to life for
"personally and intentionally discharging a firearm, proximately causing
great bodily injury or death."' 6 While juries may not be informed of the
attendant sentence for a crime or special circumstance charged, they
certainly are informed of the various elements of the crimes charged, and of
which offense is most serious. In a system with so little judicial discretion,
prosecutorial discretion in charging and plea bargaining is much greater.
Thus, a prosecutor may either choose to charge an offense degree less than
first-degree murder, or may choose not to seek a special circumstance
charge for any number of reasons that are not reviewable. By the same
token, a prosecutor may threaten very serious charges in order to get a plea
for a lesser offense.
163. PENAL § 190.2(a)(18).
164. Id. § 190.2(a)(1).
165. Id. § 189.
166. Id. § 190(a).
167. Id. § 192.
168. Id. § 192(a)-(c).
169. Id. § 192(a).
170. Id. § 193(a).
171. Id. § 188.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. § 12022(a)(1) (prescribing the additional and consecutive term of imprisonment
for persons armed with a firearm in commission of a felony).
175. Id. § 12022.53(d) (prescribing the additional and consecutive term of imprisonment
for persons who, in commission of murder or other specific felonies, personally and
intentionally discharge a firearm and proximately cause great bodily injury or death).
176. Id.
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V. THE CASES
The following section will analyze the sample cases in two ways, to
address two different questions. First, the quantitative section will seek to
answer the question of whether women and men are punished differently
by analyzing the relationships between gender and degree of offense,
weapon used, and enhancements found true. Next, the qualitative section
will take a closer look at some of the women's cases to address the
question of how the gendered nature of women's crimes affects the motives
imputed to them by courts, and how that, in turn, affects their sentences.
Finally, this section will conclude with a discussion addressing how these
legal and nonlegal factors interact in the sample cases.
A. METHODOLOGY
The sample consists of seventy-three appellate cases for convictions of
spousal homicidel7 7 in which the crime was committed during or after the
year 1990; 178 defendants included fourteen women and fifty-nine men.
Cases were found by keyword search on Westlaw in the Fall of 2009.
Records were excluded if neither degree of offense nor sentence were
explicitly stated. Records stating first- or second-degree murder and no
sentence were included, but where the sentence could not be deduced from
the information in the opinion, those cases are not included in discussions
of sentence length. Similarly, where sentence was disclosed but not degree
of offense, the case was included as degree of offense may be determined
by inference based on sentence. Records were similarly excluded when the
offense was committed against multiple victims.179  The cases include
parole denial appeals, habeas corpus petitions, and appeals from
conviction. All appeals concerning the same defendant for the same
offense were consolidated. The cases were examined to identify relevant
factors and then coded by form and entered in a Microsoft Excel
spreadsheet. Data were stored and edited in Excel and analyzed in Excel
and SPSS.
177. The cases were limited to opposite-sex couples, either spouses or long-term
cohabitating partners, in which one partner murdered the other in California after 1989.
While murders are comnmitted by non-cohabitating significant others, limiting the sample to
partners who cohabitated before or at the time of the murder restricted the set of issues
involved. Cases with same-sex couples were excluded for similar reasons: the law's
treatment of LGB individuals and same-sex relationships has changed dramatically over the
last twenty years and it would not be possible to control for those changes in examining the
cases. These issues were beyond the scope of this paper.
178. 1990 was chosen as a cutoff date to accommodate the need for a discrete timeframe,
and because the California homicide statute was changed in 1990 when the special
circumstance provisions were updated.
179. While they are excluded from the analysis because of the many ways in which a
multiple murder case can obscure or taint judgments about one count, a few of these cases
will be discussed in the qualitative section below.
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Because the sample, particularly the sample of women, is so small, this
examination of the data will produce no predictive results, but should be
considered for hypothesis-producing purposes only. Determining whether
these data correspond to larger patterns in the population of California
spousal homicides requires further research. Further, there are inherent
limitations to the data in that they are collected from appellate opinions.
These records contain very little information on the race and age of either
the defendants or decedents. This leaves two potentially significant
variables out of the analysis that could have a bearing on the outcome of
the cases. 80  Further, because the cases come from counties across
California, where there may be very different rates of spousal homicide and
different prosecutorial policies regarding charging, important local trends
may be obscured. Finally, appellate records do not provide perfect
recitations of the facts of a particular case; they necessarily are limited to
the information necessary to decide the issues before the court. Thus, some
of the records in this study had detailed information regarding the
relationships between the defendants and victims, while others were largely
limited to recitation of procedural history. This variety means that some
inaccuracies regarding individual cases are inevitable, and underscores the
need for a closer look at the trends observed and discussed in this Note.
The cases in the sample come from twenty of the fifty-eight counties in
California.s'8  As of the 2000 U.S. Census, these counties accounted for
more than 87% of California's population.182 The fifteen most populous
counties as of 2000 are all included, as are all counties with a population
density greater than 1000 people per square mile.'83  Additionally, these
counties accounted for at least 86% of domestic violence arrests that
occurred in California each year from 1989 to 1998.184 The counties not
represented in the data, include many that have small populations;
therefore, their exclusion should not call into question the hypothesis-
producing utility of this Note.
180. A number of sources show a correlation between each of age, ethnicity, race, and
rate of abuse. See e.g. ALICIA BUGARIN, CALIFORNIA RESEARCH BUREAU, THE PREVALENCE
OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN CALIFORNIA 4 (2002), available at www.library.ca.gov/
CRB/02/16/02-016.pdf (last visited Dec. 30, 2009); California Office of the Attorney
General, Homicide in California at 22, 70.
181 . The counties included in this data set are: Alameda, Contra Costa, El Dorado,
Fresno, Kern, Los Angeles, Merced, Monterey, Orange, Riverside, Sacramento, San
Bemadino, San Diego, San Francisco, San Joaquin, San Mateo, Santa Barbara, Santa Clara,
Stanislaus, and Ventura.
182. See U.S. Census Bureau, California by County http://www.census.gov/census2000/
states/ca.html (select "State by County"). As of the 2000 Census, these counties accounted
for 29,609,622 people, out of California's total population of 33,871,648. Id.
183. Id.
184. STATE OF CALIFORNIA OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, REPORT ON ARRESTS FOR
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN CALIFORNIA, 1998, at 18 (1999), available at http://ag.ca.gov/cjsc/
pubs.php#domesticViolence, (last visited Dec. 30, 2009).
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B. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS: GENDER, WEAPONS, AND ENHANCEMENTS
This qualitative section will demonstrate that first, the way we
construct "intent" and second, our policy choices regarding which means of
killing we penalize more severely, affect men's and women's cases in
different ways. The examination of weapons used in homicides will
demonstrate that women and men use different means to kill. Analysis of
the relationship between weapon used and degree of offense will show that
while most weapons have little to no observable affect on the degree of
conviction in the cases discussed here, use of personal weapons makes a
conviction for first-degree murder unlikely. Finally, examining the
relationship between weapon use and enhancements found true will
illustrate that the policy choices behind levying additional penalties for
certain kinds of killings have a perverse effect in the domestic arena by
penalizing self-defense while ignoring a particularly brutal category of
spousal homicide.
In the sample, the largest offense category among men was first-degree
murder, followed closely by second-degree murder, with the category of
voluntary manslaughter making up less than 5% of the men's cases (see
Table 1). In contrast, the largest offense category among women was
second-degree murder, followed by first-degree murder, with the category
of voluntary manslaughter making up nearly one-fifth of the cases.
While the proportions are slightly different, this pattern can be seen in
the population of all California prisoners serving time for murder
convictions (see Table 2). Among men, the largest category of homicide
offense is first-degree murder, followed closely by second-degree murder,
with voluntary manslaughter a distant third. Among women, the largest
category is second-degree murder, followed by first-degree murder, with
voluntary manslaughter coming in third, but making up a much larger
proportion of the cases than among men (nearly 20%, vs. approximately
12% among men).
These results support previous findings that women tend to be
convicted of less serious offenses than do men. They do not, without
further facts, constitute a finding that for spousal murder, women tend to be
punished more severely than men.
1. Weapons
Studies previously cited have noted that men and women have different
gun use patterns.18 According to some sources, women use guns and
185. SMART, supra note 64, at 16-17. "Women offenders ... were far less likely to beat a
victim to death or to use excessive violence, such as multiple stab wounds, on their victims."
Id.; see also SMrmi & FAROLE, supra note 25, at 3. 41% of female defendants in Smith &
Farole's study, and 24% of male defendants used a weapon during an incident of intimate
partner violence. Id. Female defendants were more likely to use a sharp or blunt object
than were males. Id.
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knives in intimate partner violence more frequently than men. In the
sample data, all but two women-over 90% of the sample-used a gun or a
knife (see Table 3). In contrast, just over half of the men in the sample
used a gun or knife, and more than one in five used a personal weapon-
their fists, feet, or hands.1 87  These findings are congruent with prior
research on weapon use among women and men. 188
Men and women both used guns and knives in cases which earned
conviction in all four categories. However, men who killed with their
hands and feet were unlikely to receive sentences for first-degree murder.
While use of other weapons was not found to have a relationship to degree
of offense, degree of offense was found to be dependent on use of personal
weapons. 189 The caveat must be included that with a sample size this
small, the results may not be replicated in a larger population. However, of
the thirteen men who killed their wives by beating or strangling them to
death, ten were convicted of second-degree murder, one was convicted of
voluntary manslaughter, and only two were convicted of first-degree
murder.
Intent may be inferred from the defendant's actions. The use of
weapons other than personal weapons may serve as proxy for intent. Use
of weapon and type of weapon used may indicate the defendant had the
intention to kill, and may indicate whether that intent was unlawful, or
based in reasonable apprehension of imminent danger of great bodily
injury. That is, they may indicate the intent to kill unlawfully or in self-
defense. Whereas beating someone to death permits the inference that the
killing was the result of a physical altercation that got out of hand-
negating first-degree murder-aiming and firing a gun has been found to
show intent.190 A knife may not signal intent as clearly-while a gun's
main purpose is to kill someone with minimal personal force, knives have
other, nonlethal uses, such as cooking. Nonetheless, a knife may serve as a
better proxy for intent than personal weapons do since it augments an
individual's physical strength and is likely to cause greater harm with less
effort than the use of personal weapons. Given that women appear to use
these weapons more frequently than men in intimate partner violence, they
186. SMITH & FAROLE, supra note 25, at 3.
187. See Id.
188. Id.
189. Chi-square test, X2 = 8.253, degrees of freedom = 2, significant at the 99% interval.
This sample is too small to have a high degree of confidence, however.
190. See Commonwealth v. Carroll, 194 A.2d 911, 915 (Pa. 1963). "The specific intent to
kill which is necessary to constitute a nonfelony murder, murder in the first-degree, may be
found from a defendant's words or conduct or from the attendant circumstances together
with all reasonable inferences therefrom, and may be inferred from the intentional use of a
deadly weapon on a vital part of the body of another human being." Id. (internal citations
omitted).
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may be subject to the conviction of more serious offenses to the extent that
such weapons signal intent to the court and jury.
Knives and guns may also signal self-defense. In particular, they are
likely to be more useful to women in self-defense than other weapons,
because generally women's physical stature limits the usefulness of their
personal weapons in altercations with larger, stronger men. Knives require
close physical proximity-for that reason, their use may be a good proxy
for true self-defense quarrel, though such an inference is certainly fact-
dependant. On the other hand, using a knife is very risky, precisely
because it requires close proximity to the target. Knives are common
household items, and smaller, weaker parties can use them to ward off
larger aggressors, which is why they are common instruments in sudden,
unplanned murders. At the other extreme, hiring a killer or using poison,
as some women in the sample did, requires almost no physical proximity to
the victim. This minimizes personal risk for an aggressor with less
physical strength than her victim, and could compensate for women's
typical physical disadvantages against a man in cases of premeditated
murder.
A gun is useful in premeditated murder, self-defense, and intimidation.
It is also useful against a person of greater physical strength. It is the great
equalizer. 191 This dual nature is illustrated in the cases. Women in the
sample who used poison or arranged for others to kill their husbands were
all convicted of first-degree murder; the women who used knives were
convicted of second-degree murder or voluntary manslaughter. Gun use is
present in all three categories of offense.
2. Enhancements
Every woman but one in the sample was given at least one special
circumstance or enhancement by the jury. Twenty-three out of fifty-seven
(40.4%) of the men received neither a special circumstance nor weapons
enhancement. This finding is clearly related to the foregoing discussion of
weapon use. Women are unlikely to kill men using personal weapons, or
by other means, which require overpowering men with physical force.
191. This is not to say that women and men are equally likely to own or use a gun overall.
Gallup polls have consistently shown higher gun ownership rates among men than women.
The same is true for white respondents as opposed to respondents of color; older (thirty and
up) as opposed to younger (eighteen to thirty) respondents; and respondents in the Midwest
and South as opposed to Northeast and West. See Gun Ownership and Use in America,
GALLUP (Nov. 22, 2005), http://www.gallup.coi/poll/20098/gun-ownership-use-
america.aspx. Gun ownership varies by income level. Id. Most of these factors cannot be
controlled for in this study. Reference to guns as "the great equalizer" indicates merely that
handgun or shotgun use does not place the same demands on the user for physical strength
or proximity as do other hand-held weapons.
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Defendants using guns received enhancements or special circumstances in
every case in the sample. Knives triggered enhancements in most cases.
But personal weapons did not trigger enhancements for use of a "dangerous
or deadly weapon." If a means of killing that is immune to weapons
enhancements is generally available to men and not to women, then to the
extent that men employ that means they will receive more lenient sentences
than women. Further, if men who commit murder with personal weapons
use are unlikely to receive a conviction higher than second-degree murder,
to the extent that men use weapons to commit murder, they will be
convicted of first-degree murder less frequently.
In cases where the defendant used a gun, enhancements were given in
all but one case. Where knives or other sharp objects were used, an
enhancement was given in over 80% of cases, or fifteen out of eighteen
times. Weapons enhancements are intended to discourage the use of
firearms, and to a lesser extent, other "deadly and dangerous" weapons in
the commission of violent crimes. While some firearms enhancements
require personal use, or direct or proximate effects of gun use, merely
being armed with a firearm during the commission of a felony is sufficient
to incur a firearm enhancement. Other weapons receive enhancements
when they are deemed "deadly or dangerous." Identifying an object used
to kill as deadly or dangerous may be less straightforward than determining
that a gun is a firearm for the purposes of an enhancement. While a knife
may frequently be considered "deadly" or "dangerous," particularly once it
has been used to commit murder, other items may be more ambiguous, and,
thus, do not earn enhancements for the harm they are used to inflict.
Examples of such "ambiguous" items used by sample defendants include
pillows, plastic bags, or a floor or wall.
These findings may also indicate that weapons enhancements are
always or very nearly always charged and found true for gun crimes, but
that charging knife crimes may be subject to greater prosecutorial
discretion and enhancements for remaining weapons are more discretionary
still. If that is so, and knife enhancements are treated as optional, it is
interesting that the women in the sample seemed to receive them more
consistently than the men did. Of course, the sample contains many fewer
women than men, so it is possible that men and women are charged with
and convicted of weapons enhancements at similar rates, but that such a
pattern cannot be observed here due to the limited sample size. If this is
not the case, however, the higher rate of weapon enhancement convictions
would support contentions that, in some cases, women are treated more
harshly than men. It may also be that, because prosecutors are less likely to
secure a harsh sentence with women defendants, they put more emphasis
on enhancements than they would with a man, who would be more likely
than a woman to receive a serious sentence, such as life without parole. Of
the men's cases in which it appeared that possible enhancements were not
[Vol. 22:1144
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listed, two appeared to be life without parole cases, one was a twenty-five
years to life case, and the remaining three were all second-degree murder
cases in which the appellant was serving an indeterminate sentence of
fifteen years to life.
Finally, for the purposes of prosecuting weapon use, it may be easier to
prove gun use than the dangerous and deadly nature of other types of
weapons. This is especially likely to be true when multiple factors could
have contributed to the victim's death. For example, in one of the cases in
which no enhancement was reported, the coroner determined the cause of
death was ligature strangulation and the victim had marks on her neck
consistent with ligature strangulation, but she had also been suffocated with
a plastic bag, shocked with a stun gun, and beaten with a blunt object.19
On the other hand, this defendant was found guilty of committing homicide
by torture, so it may be that the prosecutor was less concerned with a
weapons enhancement than with securing a sentence of life without parole
or death, or that the reviewing court did not think the weapons
enhancement significant enough to mention.' 93
Thus, it seems most likely that enhancements are routinely charged and
found true for gun crimes, somewhat less so for crimes involving sharp
objects, and occasionally but not routinely for crimes involving ligature
strangulation and blunt objects.
C. QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS: PROTOTYPES AND OUTCOMES
To examine whether mutual aggression and general "badness" levels
seem to correspond with women's murder convictions, cases were divided
into four categories. For the purposes of this discussion the one case
involving a woman with multiple victims will be included, to offer the
example of the most extreme situation observable here.19 4  Cases are
excluded in which neither specific enhancements nor aggregate sentence is
discussed, making it impossible to judge final sentence.'95
192. People v. Speights, No. G039761, 2008 WL 4928014, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 18,
2008).
193. Id. at 2.
194. It should be recalled that this case was excluded from the quantitative data in
Section. B, which examined outcomes based on the relationship between plaintiff and a
single victim. See discussion supra Section B. "Multiple victims" is a special circumstance
which, when found true, qualifies a convicted offender for life without parole or the death
penalty. PENAL § 190.2(a)(17). Such an offense is necessarily considered more brutal and
worthy of condemnation than a comparable offense with a single victim, whether in the
arena of intimate partner violence or more "normal" violence. This may seem intuitively
and normatively true. While this fact could influence the jury outside of any elements
charged or found true, it is also a legal fact to be found by the jury. Thus offenses with
multiple victims are legally different from offenses with a single victim.
195. See, e.g. People v. Greer, No. G030839, 2003 WL 21500700 (Cal. Ct. App. July 1,
2003).
145
HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL
The first category of cases is "Financial Gain," and consists of women
who fit the stereotype of the gold-digging black widow. 196 The second is
"Protection of Personal Interest," in which the facts as stated by the court
indicate that the appellant had not acted in pursuit of profit, but had been
protecting some other non-self-defense interest not recognized as
legitimate. The third category is "Mutual Aggression" in which the facts,
as related by the appellate court, indicate that the murder victim had
physically harmed or severely emotionally abused the appellant, but in
which there was also evidence of the appellate behaving in an aggressive or
unkind way. The fourth and final category is "Actual Harm" in which the
facts reported show that the appellant had not exercised violence outside of
the homicidal act, but her husband did.
1. Financial Gain
This category represents arguably the worst of female crime against
partners. Financial gain murders illustrate "[d]ependence turned to gall and
greed; trust betrayed; love and duty mocked."' 97 Women in this category
have gone beyond self-interest, prioritizing money over love and intimacy,
a quality reviled in women, whether they are "gold-digging" younger wives
or prostitutes. The two women in this category are Mary Ellen Samuels,
the only woman in the sample on death row, convicted of multiple murders
in the same transaction'" and Nora Andaya Bonnaudet, who is serving a
sentence of life without parole for first-degree murder and the special
circumstance of murder for financial gain.' 99
Mary Ellen Samuels hired her daughter's boyfriend to kill her former
husband, telling the young man that Mr. Samuels had abused her daughter
sexually.200 She then became concerned that her ex-husband's killer would
201turn her in, and hired another man to kill the first hit man. Samuels
gained more than a quarter of a million dollars from her ex-husband's
death, in revenue from his life insurance policies and uncashed payroll
checks, combined with the sale of their Subway sandwich franchise and the
refinancing of their home.20 2 At her trial, the prosecutor introduced
evidence that Samuels had spent all the money in a year,203 but did not pay
for her husband's funeral. 204 Further, police officers who were present at
196. See Rapaport, Domestic Discount, supra note 67, at 1517.
197. Id.
198. People v. Samuels, 36 Cal. 4th 96 (2005).
199. People v. Bonnaudet, No. B164987, 2004 WL 1664018, at * I (Cal. Ct. App. July
27, 2004).
200. Samuels, 36 Cal. 4th at 110.
201. Id. at 105.
202. Id. at 103.
203. Id. at 112 n.2.
204. Id. at 113.
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the crime scene testified that Samuels was dressed and acting in a
205
provocative manner.
Nora Andaya Bonnaudet was twenty-four years younger than her
husband, who was an illiterate but well-off handyman and real estate
speculator.206 When they married, he paid off her $10,000 credit card debts
and bought her a car; shortly thereafter he "executed a will that left
'virtually everything"' to her.207 Bonnaudet appears to have staged a
robbery in which her husband was beaten to death.20 8 The court's opinion
also implies that she took advantage of his illiteracy by putting her name on
the deed to the house that he owned prior to their marriage.209 Shortly after
his death, Bonnaudet put the house up for sale, made withdrawals from his
bank account to which she did not have her own ATM card, requested his
life insurance policy worth about $75,000 be paid out to her, and
additionally requested that annuities in the amount of $146,000 owed to
him be transferred to her name.2 10 She was also having an affair at the time
of his death.
In both of these cases, there was no evidence credited by the Court that
either husband had mistreated the appellant. Samuels began soliciting
people to kill her husband beginning more than a year before his death,
refused to pay for his funeral despite receiving his life insurance funds, and
rather than showing distress or concern at her husband's crime scene,
behaved "provocatively." Bonnaudet's husband was displeased with his
wife's spendthrift habits and concerned about her co-ownership of his
home. Further, he was a seventy-eight-year-old man who she apparently
had beaten to death. 2 1 1 The common thread in these cases is that both of
these women not only profited from their husband's deaths, but also seem
to have hired or made arrangements with other parties to carry out the
killings. Both demonstrated callousness beyond that necessary for murder;
Samuels not only hired a man to kill her husband, but hired another man to
205. Samuels, 36 Cal. 4th at 113.
206. Bonnaudet,2004WL 1664018, at *1.
207. Id. at *1.
208. Id. at *1-2. Bonnaudet witnessed her husband being assaulted by two men the
morning of his death. Id. at * 1. Two men approached her husband in a parking lot, one hit
him in the face and the other went through his pockets and took nothing. Id. That night she
reported that the same assailants had returned after she and her husband reported the earlier
attack, beat her husband and put him in his car. Id. However, the officer who interviewed
her that evening testified that she told him the assailants were African-American, whereas
she and her husband reported the initial attack as performed by two Arab-American
appearing men. Id. *1-2. Further, according to the coroner her husband had died between
an hour and a half and two hours before the police arrived on the scene, whereas she
reported the incident as having just occurred. Id. at *2. Finally, the blood on her husband
and the car was not consistent with him having been beaten outside the car and then placed
inside it. Id. at *2.
209. Id. at *2.
210. Id.
211. Bonnaudet, 2004 WL 1664018, at *2
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kill the initial hit man.2 12 Bonnaudet had her husband killed in a brutal
way-by having him beaten to death.213
The combination of pecuniary gain and arranged murders demonstrates
both intent and detached killing. These murders both satisfy legal
requirements for premeditation and also fit neatly under the "evil woman"
theory. Even without the gendered implications of the "black widow"
stereotype associated with killings of this type, profiting from someone's
death, particularly one's spouse, is easily considered evil. The repudiation
of a wife's role as compassionate and supportive, the moral center of the
household, compounds this perception of the offense.
2. Self-Protection
The second category includes women who murdered out of self-interest
or self-protection that was not rooted in self-defense but that was also not
pecuniary in nature. These women wanted out of their marriages without
risking a custody battle,2 14 or were protecting themselves from the
consequences of their drug use and extramarital affairs.215 These behaviors
are also seen as "bad," but not to the same degree as those of the first
group. The women in this group are pursuing or defending goals that are
not all in themselves illegitimate: remaining with one's children, getting
out of a marriage in which one's partner has sabotaged her success, or
retaining a significant job and relationship are all recognizable legitimate
goals. But the means by which these women pursued their goals-
murdering their spouses-were illegitimate. While one of the women in
this category did ask others to kill her husband, in the end, all of these
women committed the murders themselves.
The sentences in this group are not quite as long as those in the
previous group. The longest sentence in this group is that of Kristin M.
Rossum, serving life without parole. Rossum killed her husband after he
threatened to reveal to her employer that she was using methamphetamine
216
and having an affair with her supervisor. Rossum was addicted to
methamphetamine when she and her late husband met. 217 He helped her to
quit, and she returned to college and got a job at the Office of the Medical
Examiner where she helped analyze drug samples for criminal
prosecutions. 21 8 There she began having an affair with her supervisor and
212. Samuels, 36 Cal. 4th at 105 (Cal. 2005).
213. Bonnaudet, 2004 WL 1664018, at *2.
214. People v. Provencio, No. E027642, 2002 WL 31045485, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept.
13, 2002).
215. People v. Rossum, No. D041343, 2005 WL 1385312, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. June 13,
2005).
216. Id.
217. Rossum, 2005 WL 1385312, at *1.
218. Id. at* *1-2.
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resumed using methamphetamine. 2 19 When her husband threatened to
reveal her affair and her drug use to her supervisors if she did not quit,
Rossum poisoned him with drugs that she and her lover apparently stole
from the lab. 22 0
The remaining two cases in this category include Karen Provencio,
who is serving fifty years to life for first-degree murder for killing her
husband in his sleep,221 and Kim Pace-White, who is serving forty years to
life for the murder of her husband for reasons not stated in the record,
following years of reportedly subjecting him to routine bullying, if not
abuse. 222
Provencio's husband had stopped working, and the family's financial
troubles included a home foreclosure and the loss of a busineSs223
Provencio began talking about killing her husband with her neighbors,
including offering a neighbor-her lover-$100,000 to kill him.224 While
she told friends shortly before the killing that he was mean to her,
Provencio said she could not leave because she did not want to share
custody of their children.2 25 Provencio killed her husband in December of
1998. Several times over the two years preceding the murder, she told her
neighbor she wanted him dead, and Provencio once told her neighbor that
she had gotten somebody to do it.2 26 She asked two different lovers over
the course of two years to kill her husband, and once told one of them that
her sister had agreed to do it, but had "chickened out." 22 7 She and her
husband fought the night he died, and their children reported he was crying
while she was in the other room making phone calls.228 She shot him in the
head while he was sleeping.229
Pace-White was convicted in part by testimony of neighbors that the
victim was gentle and "easy-going" and that the appellant was
domineering,230 and a witness who had seen "[Pace-White] holding a gun
and threatening to kill, or shoot, [her husband]." 2 3 1 Afterward, she fled to
Alabama with her children, where she was arrested.232 The facts in Pace-
White's appeal do not paint a picture of motive. From the description
given in the opinion, it seems possible that this is a case of a woman
219. Rossum, 2005 WL 1385312, at *2.
220. Id. at *3, *5.
221. Provencio, 2002 WL 31045485, at *1.
222. Pace-White, 2002 WL 661557, at *1.
223. Provencio, 2002 WL 31045485 at *1.
224. Id. at *1-2.
225. Id. at *2.
226. Pace-White, 2002 WL 661557, at *1.
227. Id. at *2.
228. Id.
229. Id. at *1.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
149
abusing and then killing her male partner. Neighbors reported having seen
Pace-White brandish a gun on previous occasions, sometimes at her
husband.233 One neighbor saw Pace-White "holding a gun and threatening
to kill, or shoot, [her husband]."2 34 The court reported finding no evidence
in the record "that Mr. White was violent toward defendant at any time
close to the time of his death." 2 35 Neighbors said Mr. White was "laid back
and quiet" while Pace-White yelled at Mr. White and told him "to 'bow
down' and 'worship' her." 2 36 The court rejected the appellant's contention
in this context that appellant was a domestic violence victim,
notwithstanding White's arrest for felony spousal abuse in 1996.237
That such a case would result in a lesser sentence than a self-defense
case may be troubling, depending on how abuse is viewed. If partner abuse
is predatory, as contract murder for pecuniary gain very arguably is, then a
second-degree murder conviction and forty years to life seems appalling
when the other seemingly predatory women in this sample received
sentences of life without parole or death. If, on the other hand, domestic
violence culminating in murder is "hot-blooded," a lower sentence for such
killings comports with the law's general prioritization of "cold-blooded"
killings as a more serious of an affront to social order than "crimes of
,,238passion.
3. Mutual Aggression
In this group are women whose cases show evidence that, prior to the
homicide, they endured is equivocal threats of violence, or of violent or
threatening behavior from their husbands. The cases also show evidence of
the women's aggressive or otherwise "bad" behavior outside of the
homicidal act.
The defendant with the most lenient sentence in this category is
Marilyn Hudnall-Johnson who killed her drug-abusing husband.239
Hudnall-Johnson presented evidence that she had been abused in prior
relationships and that her father had abused her mother.240 She presented
an expert who contended that her insistence on taking her husband back
repeatedly following separations and despite his frequent theft from her to
support his drug habit was a product of the abuse she had sustained in a
previous marriage and the abuse she had witnessed growing up. 24 1 She
233. Pace-White, 2002 WL 661557, at *1.
234. Id.
235. Id. at *6.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. See generally Victoria Nourse, Passion's Progress 106 YALE L.J. 1331 (1997).
239. People v. Hudnall-Johnson, No. A 19004, 2009 WL 499151, at *5-6 (Cal. Ct. App.
Feb. 27, 2009).
240. Hudnall-Johnson, 2009 WL 499151, at *5-6.
241. Id. at *8.
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stabbed her husband during a struggle in which, she contended, he tried to
break into their home. She admitted he had never broken in before and
would likely have stopped trying to get in if she ignored him. 2 4 2 However,
she also presented evidence that she was on pain killers and sleeping
medication that night,243 and that when her husband was high he was
sexually demanding 2" and had frequently stolen her belongings to buy
drugs.245 On one such occasion, he did so when she was out of the house
overnight, having been arrested for domestic violence against him.246
Significantly, she was the only woman in the sample with prior domestic
violence arrests, 24 7 as well as the only one with a prior conviction (for
violating welfare regulations).24 8
The remaining two cases are both second-degree murder cases in which
the defendants either showed evidence of psychological abuse but no
249
evidence of significant physical abuse by the deceased husband, or
showed evidence of physical abuse that was met with evidence of the
defendant's aggressive behavior, including threats and acts of
250
aggression. In both cases the prosecution raised the specter of mutual
abuse in argument or via expert testimony.
In Patricia Johnson's case, a prosecution expert testified that Johnson
and her husband were both "engaged in emotionally abusive and unhealthy
behavior in their relationship, with each trying to control the other's
behavior." 25 1 Johnson testified that her husband began having affairs and
lying to her shortly after they moved in together.252 She left but took him
back when he promised to change, though each time this occurred he went
back to his old ways.253 She testified that she became anxious and could
not work or function either when they were together or when she left
him.254 He began monitoring her behavior closely, making rules for when
she could talk to him, told her he would charge her money for their
vacation together, and on one occasion made her agree to let him have an
affair if she accused him of cheating on her.255
At Loida Cruz's trial, evidence was introduced of her threats to her
husband, an altercation that she and her brother insisted consisted of her
242. Hudnall-Johnson, 2009 WL 499151, at *5.
243. Id. at *7.
244. Id. at *6.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at *1.
248. Id.
249. People v. Johnson, No. D0493 57, 2008 WL 2068207 (Cal. Ct. App. May 16, 2008).
250. People v. Cruz, No. A107426, 2006 WL 2468762 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug 28, 2006).
251. Johnson, 2008 WL 2068207 at *10.
252. Id. at *2.
253. Id. at *3.
254. Johnson, 2008 WL 2068207 at *3.
255. Id.
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husband beating her, whereas her sister-in-law's boyfriend insisted that the
"fight" was actually her husband acting in self-defense.2 56 The prosecution
introduced a recording of an argument in which Loida Cruz threatened to
kill her husband if he left her.257 This recording was played as evidence of
her serious intent to kill him, conveyed not only by the content but the tone
of the recording.25 8 The recording, which was in Tagalog, was also stopped
and started throughout the argument as the appellant's husband intended to
use it to discredit Loida in the future. 2 59 The deceased's relatives and ex-
wife also testified he was gentle and that they had seen the appellant hit and
threaten to kill him many times.2 60 Cruz stabbed her husband forty-eight
times;261 she claimed to have grabbed the knife to keep him from hurting
her after he reached for it during their fight.262 She did not believe that she
had actually inflicted all his wounds and testified that she did not mean to
kill him.263
It is arguable that mixed evidence of aggression, or evidence that does
not include physical harm, limited the ability of these women to access
victim frames, such as those offered by Battered Woman Syndrome
testimony. Johnson, who was not physically abused and did not act in a
physically aggressive way or make threats prior to the homicide, received a
conviction for second-degree murder.26 Cruz, who had been treated
violently and had acted violently, including making threats, received a
conviction for second-degree murder.265 Hudnall-Johnson, who had
previously been arrested for spousal abuse and had admitted to stabbing her
husband on a prior occasion, received a conviction for voluntary
manslaughter.266 This could mean that, at least on its own, "mutual
aggression" has limited negative effect for women advancing abuse
evidence.
These outcomes could also be an indication that in examining the
relationship prior to the homicide, the worth of the decedent matters as
much as the worth of the defendant. Hudnall-Johnson's husband was a
drug user and while he hadn't physically harmed her previously, the fact
that he had stolen from her while she was sleeping or out of the house may
have made her husband seem less worth vindicating than Johnson and
Cruz's husbands seemed. Further, Hudnall-Johnson stabbed her husband
256. Cruz, 2006 WL 2468762, at *13.
257. Id. at *2
258. Id. at *16--17.
259. Id. at *17.
260. Id. at *14.
261. Id. at *6.
262. Id. at *10.
263. Id. at *1l.
264. Johnson, 2008 WL 2068207, at * 1.
265. Cruz, 2006 WL 2468762, at *1.
266. Hudnall-Johnson, 2009 WL 499151, *1.
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only once, during a fight in which he had hurt her. Finally, she called the
police as soon as she realized he was hurt. In contrast, Johnson shot her
husband in his sleep, and Cruz stabbed her husband more than forty times
and refused to call 911 or allow others to do so.
4. Self-Defense
These cases are arguably the ones most affected by the use of prior
battering evidence. In one appeal, a woman convicted of second-degree
murder obtained a new trial based on her attorney's failure to present
Battered Woman Syndrome evidence at her trial in 1991.267 Originally
sentenced to nineteen years to life in prison, Hudie Joyce Walker had been
beaten regularly by her husband, and the morning of the shooting he
pointed a gun at her and said "Today will be your last goddamned day on
this Earth." 2 68 She was at their home attempting to collect her things and
leave when he walked in.26 9 She contended at her first trial that her
husband reached for a gun he had tossed between them, and in the struggle
to gain control of it before he did, the gun went off, accidentally shooting
him.270 She testified to years of abuse fueled by her husband's drinking;
she told the court that she would periodically leave him, only to return
when he would promise to change.2 7 1
Changes in the law required the court give an instruction sua sponte on
imperfect self-defense as a lesser included offense when supported by the
facts, even when the defense made a strategic choice to focus on a different
theory. This allowed certain defendants, otherwise denied the opportunity
to present evidence on battering, to challenge their convictions on those
grounds through the writ habeas corpus.2 72 Thanks to these changes,
Walker could argue that self-defense supported by Battered Woman
Syndrome evidence would make a difference in her trial, and that she
should be granted the opportunity for a new trial.273 The appellate decision
granting her a new trial discusses at length the significance of this type of
evidence in such cases, as well as the legislative intent behind it. 274
Ultimately the disposition in this case reflects changes in the law and
possibly judicial attitudes toward physical abuse since the 1980s. Walker's
story fits into the framework of the cycle of violence,2 75 feminine
meekness, and the utter brutality of an abuser who would not only assault
267. In re Walker, 147 Cal. App. 4th 533 (2007).
268. Id. at 538.
269. Id. at 539.
270. Id. at 540.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 550.
273. Id. at 552-53.
274. In re Walker, 147 Cal. App. 4th at 545-48.
275. Adams, supra note 108.
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his wife, but point firearms at her-a clear and unmistakable threat to harm
her.
Mary Lee Ross' case is a voluntary manslaughter case in which she is
serving a lower term of three years, plus an enhancement of three years for
using a gun.276 Ross's husband stabbed her, pointed guns at her, and beat
her severely, including punching her, slamming her head against the floor,
and swinging a bat at her.277 He was paranoid, convinced of a "conspiracy"
that was out to get him. 2 78 On previous occasions Ross had been able to
deter him from killing her by threatening to shoot herself with the gun he
required her to keep by her side of the bed. 279 On this occasion, he accused
her for the first time of being a member of the "conspiracy," and accused
her of preventing him from being able to get a job.280 When she attempted
to dissuade him from harming her by the usual means, he only told her
she'd "make [his] job easier."281 He told her to get in bed and lay down
and said "I'm going to kill you," hit her, and reached for the gun he kept on
his side of the bed.2 82 She shot him with the gun she had hidden in her
pillow when he told her to go to bed.283
In both of these cases, not only was the physical violence inflicted on
the women is severe, the men in these cases carried guns that they used to
menace their wives in confrontations shortly before the killing.
Additionally, there was little to no evidence that either woman had acted
aggressively, cheated, or otherwise behaved in an "unfeminine" way.
Although Walker left her husband, he convinced her to return; she returned
and tried to make the marriage work. Both women presented Battered
Woman Syndrome evidence, but they also fit into "acceptable" categories
of behavior and presented husbands whose brutality was beyond dispute.
There is no equivocation about whether a man who brutally beats his wife
and points guns at her might be capable of murdering her; the only possible
dispute is whether she could have reasonably done anything to escape or
stop the violence short of killing.
VI. DISCUSSION
The cases presented show that a number of case factors vary as
convictions become more or less severe. Weapon use may signal intent,
but weapons may also be necessary for women to be able to defend
themselves against abusive male partners. However, use of weapons most
276. People v. Ross, No. 050100222, 2005 WL 1519108, *1 (Cal. Ct. App. June 28,
2005).
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. at *2.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.
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common among the women in this sample put a woman at higher risk of
receiving an enhancement along with her conviction. Significantly, the
seriousness of enhancements varies along with seriousness of crimes.
The women in the "Actual Harm" group had enhancements of three
and four years-and the higher of the two was granted a new trial. In the
next category, more serious, sustained cases had enhancements ranging
from one to three years. In the Self-Interest group, the few with
indeterminate sentences both received twenty-five years to life in prison as
enhancements. One woman in the possible threat group received this
enhancement, but significantly, hers was also the only case reversed in that
group.
These cases indicate that, to some degree, in spousal murder cases
access to Battered Woman Syndrome frames and risk of "evil woman"
status vary along with seriousness of crimes. Because race and age data are
missing, there is no basis for evaluating the effects these factors have on
sentencing or access to potentially mitigating framing.
Future research in this vein could access trial information for a greater
depth of knowledge about the facts of cases. Additionally, because plea
bargains occur in an overwhelming majority of adjudicated cases, research
should be done to investigate the role these factors play in plea bargaining
as well.
VII. CONCLUSION
Women whose stories comport with more traditionally acceptable
notions of victimhood are likely to receive more lenient sentences. Women
who are routinely physically harmed by their partners and can show a
plausible "kill or be killed" scenario will benefit the most at trial. Women
who cannot show physical harm but can show the undesirability of their
male partners as well as their own attempts to be a good wife and mother,
such as Marilyn Hudnall-Johnson, may also be accorded sympathy in court.
Emotional abuse, however harmful it may be found by a psychological
expert, will not negate malice, though it might supply provocation, as in the
case of Patricia Johnson. Women who kill for gain will be accorded severe
punishments, particularly if that gain is financial. The most severe cases,
such as Mary Ellen Samuels, and the most sympathetic cases, such as
Hudie Joyce Walker's, may comport with traditional notions of contract
killing for financial gain and imperfect self-defense, and thus be relatively
uncontroversial. However, the cases in the middle are those in which the
ability of the defendant to fit with notions of appropriate femininity may be
the most significant.
In the context of domestic homicide, women are disproportionately
affected by weapons enhancement statutes aimed at discouraging the use of
firearms. Due to the typical size difference in heterosexual couples, a
woman is less likely to use personal weapons or weapons that otherwise
155
require use of superior physical force against her partner than she is to have
such weapons used against her. To the extent such enhancements have
efficacy in discouraging firearm use in other violent felonies, they are not
equally applicable to the domestic context where motive for violent
offenses may be quite different. Further, the emphasis placed on punishing
use of firearms, when viewed in light of the ways that women die at the
hands of "unarmed" male assailants, seems to put an undeserved weight on
the faster and arguably less horrifying death provided by a gun rather than a
beating death.
As previously indicated, this Note is not intended to provide predictive
data. Future research in this area should look at cases- at the trial level, and
would ideally examine a larger sample. Focus on a narrower geographic
region would provide more comparable cases by limiting the extent to
which differing juror attitudes or social would affect case outcomes.
Further, examination of the ways in which male defendants are punished or
rewarded for "typical" or "atypical" male behavior in homicide cases could
provide deeper insight into whether men are similarly constrained by
gender roles.
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